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This article presents three different causal arguments for religious activism—social 
movements, fundamentalism, and Cosmic War—and the conditions under which 
religiously motivated violence occur. These three causal arguments offer a spectrum of 
goals within religious activism, ranging from challenging social practices and 
government policies, to defending specific interpretations and practices of the faith, to 
hastening the apocalypse. Furthermore, each of these theories proposes different ways 
that religion becomes involved in social, political and religious activism and the 
conditions under which groups use violence to further their goals. The article concludes 
by suggesting countermeasures for each type of religious activism. 
 
 
In 1994, sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer argued in The New Cold War? 
Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State that, despite expectations that religion 
would retreat further and further from mainstream society and politics to the private lives 
of individuals, a new era of religious activism, what he calls religious nationalism, is on 
the rise.
1
 Some but not all of this religious activism uses violence as a means of 
reasserting itself into public life.  At its most extreme religious suicide bombers, abortion 
clinic assassins and takfir violence—one Muslim killing another on grounds of 
apostasy—are examples of religiously motivated violence that appear to be irrational and 
to have no limits. However, not all religiously motivated violence is that extreme or 
unyielding; some of it can be for very earthly and rational goals.  
Despite Juergensmeyer’s prediction of greater religious activism, there is still 
considerable confusion over the conditions under which religious activism arises, when 
religious activists turn violent, and the goals for which these groups are fighting. To 
begin filling this gap, this article presents three different causal arguments for religious 
activism and the conditions under which religiously motivated violence occur: social 
movements, fundamentalism, and Cosmic War. These three causal arguments offer a 
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spectrum of goals within religious activism, ranging from challenging social practices 
and government policies, to defending specific interpretations and practices of the faith, 
to hastening the apocalypse. Furthermore, each of these theories proposes different ways 
that religion becomes involved in social, political and religious activism and the 
conditions under which groups use violence to further their goals.  
The article continues in five parts. The first section describes Social Movement 
Theory and offers examples of social movements that have used religion to shape, 
organize, and further their goals. The second section develops a theory of 
fundamentalism and offers examples of fundamentalist activism. The third section looks 
at Mark Juergensmeyer’s concept of Cosmic War and the conditions under which Cosmic 
War thinking emerge. The fourth section compares these different lenses and offers key 
questions for identifying the different types of religious activism. And the fifth section 
proposes countermeasures for each type of activism.  
 
Social movements and religious violence  
Social Movement Theory (SMT) posits the conditions under which grievances, 
which are plentiful, transform into mass movements aimed at social or political change. 
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald offer a particularly useful summary of the theory, 
including its evolution and its causal logic. The authors describe three variables that 
scholars of SMT have identified as necessary conditions for social movements to emerge: 
political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes.
2
 
The political opportunities variable considers how political constraints and 
opportunities, particularly institutionalized politics, shape the emergence and success of 
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social movements.  Building off of work by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and European 
scholars, the political opportunity variable focuses specifically on how changes in both 
institutionalized politics and informal groups with political power explain the emergence 
of social movements.
3
 While necessary for understanding social movements, particularly 
the timing of their emergence, the political opportunity variable is not sufficient for 
explaining the rise of all movements and particularly their success or failure.  
 Mobilizing structures, the second variable, are “those collective vehicles, informal 
as well as formal through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”4  This 
variable builds off of two sub theories: resource mobilization theory, which investigates 
the types of resources available to a group and how they are employed for mobilization; 
and social movement organizations, or how formal and informal groups and networks 
facilitate social movements.
5
 This variable focuses heavily on the process of 
mobilization, rather than opportunities, as an explanation for the conditions under which 
social movements emerge. 
 The third variable, framing processes, considers the role that narratives and a 
sense of common purpose play in the formation of social movements and success. David 
Snow defines framing as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion 
shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate 
collective action.”6 This variable includes difficult to measure aspects of social 
movements such as identity, symbols, cultural values and norms, ideology, and shared 
meaning. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald contend, “At a minimum people need to feel 
both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, 
they can redress the problem.”7 Furthermore, McAdam hypothesizes that “cognitive 
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liberation,” or the hope that change is possible, is necessary for social movements to 
emerge and is part of successful framing.
8
 Framing processes, in other words, seek to 
understand how participants in collective action understand the problem and its solution. 
Taken together, SMT posits that political opportunities, mobilizing structures and 
framing processes explain the necessary conditions that transform grievances into 
activism. As they take shape, social movements are highly visible collectives that aim to 
mobilize large numbers in order to affect change.  Social movements tend to draw on 
preexisting groups and their networks to mobilize individuals into loosely affiliated 
collectives. Given their size and loose organizational structure, social movements usually 
have porous borders and individuals can join and leave the cause with relatively little 
cost. Framing processes create the conditions through which individuals who join the 
movement share common meaning and purpose. If done correctly, framing creates a form 
of collective peer pressure, where individuals feel compelled to join up to be part of 
experience.
9
    
It is important to note that not all social movements are violent; in fact many 
successful movements have been purposefully non-violent.
10
 When social movements 
turn violent, it is typically for a few key reasons. First, political opportunities may be 
blocked, such as changing a policy or a country’s leader through elections. In such cases, 
violence becomes one of the few remaining tolls for change.  Second, social movements 
may turn to violence if the movement has become frustrated and some of its members 
feel violence is necessary to realize its goal. Third, violence can also be a tool used to 
push for negotiations with the opposition. Finally, violence may also be used as a means 
to draw attention to the cause and inspire recruits.  
 6 
 The goals of social movements are varied. They can range from mobilization to 
change a specific government policy to revolution. They can also mobilize to challenge 
social or religious issues within a country or region. Regardless of the goal, social 
movements typically have specific objectives that draw the attention and support of 
elites, formal and informal organizations, and large numbers of individuals that agree 
with that immediate objective. Typically, once a social movement has achieved its goal, it 
demobilizes.    
Religion is a particularly useful tool for social movements, although not a 
necessary condition for their emergence or success. Sociologist Christian Smith argues 
that religion can provide both key resources for mobilization and useful tools for framing. 
Resources include trained, legitimate leaders; preexisting networks, organizational 
structures and communications channels; and material resources such as money, 
buildings, schools, and hospitals.
11
 Framing resources in religion include a moral 
framework to which adherents can relate; group cohesion and common identity; symbols 
and scripture that can be interpreted to justify the cause; and stories of persecution and 
perseverance that can create fortitude in difficult times.
12
    
Several scholars have used SMT to explain the rise of recent social movements 
around the globe, including those that involve religion. The edited volume Islamic 
Activism highlights the role that Islam has played in fostering social movements, 
particularly in the Middle East. The volume considers cases where violence has been 
instrumental to the movement—such as the GIA in Algeria, groups within Egypt, and 
Hamas in Palestine—and cases where violence has not played a predominant role in 
mobilization, specifically Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
13
 Scholars have also used SMT to 
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explain the emergence of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement (led by a Christian minister, 
which utilized church networks, and used scripture to justify activism for equality);
14
 
Polish Solidarity in the 1980s, (led by a union activist, utilized international legitimacy 
and support from the Catholic church, mobilized various sectors of the population to end 
Soviet occupation);
15
 and the 1979 Iranian Revolution, (led by a cleric, mobilized various 
groups throughout the country to oust the Shah, and used Islam to justify revolt and frame 
the solution).
 16
  More recently, scholars have used SMT to explain the rise of the 2010-
2011 Arab Spring, and the different roles that religion played in uprisings throughout 




Fundamentalism theory and violence 
Fundamentalism may be the most common form of religious activism today; 
however, unlike SMT, there is no clearly articulated fundamentalism theory and defining 
the phenomenon is equally unclear. The term fundamentalism was originally used to 
explain a new conservative form of Christianity that emerged in the United States in the 
early 1900, and that formed as a counterpoint to modernism. Therefore, for some, 
fundamentalism carries an inherently Christian connotation.  More broadly the term has 
come to denote any individual or group that believes in the literal nature of scripture, 
clear-cut religious practices and beliefs, and the perception that there is an urgent need to 
get back to basics—the “fundamentals of the faith”—which are being corrupted or have 
been lost, and to reassert religion into society and, in some cases, political life.  
Several scholars note that the term fundamentalism is also problematic because it 
carries negative connotations, suggesting that fundamentalists are by definition militant, 
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extremist, irrational, unyielding and even violent.
18
 Furthermore, rarely do those 
associated with fundamentalism self-identify as such.
19
 However, despite the Christian 
origins of fundamentalism and its lack of specificity, the term does point to an important 
trend occurring across religious traditions and a phenomenon that has become entangled 
with violent action. Therefore, for lack of a better term, a theory of fundamentalism is 
proposed here.  
Building off of several works on fundamentalism, including the authors of the 
five volume series Fundamentalism Project, Mark Juergensmeyer’s work in The New 
Cold War, and the ideas of Gabriel Almond and R. Scott Appleby, it is possible to 
identify the causal logic of fundamentalism and the conditions under which 
fundamentalist movements turn to violence.  
Literature on fundamentalism identifies two triggers in particular. First, 
fundamentalists react to the rise of secularism. Fundamentalists perceive secularism 
encroaching on religion and forcing it to the margins of society and political life, which 
they believe should be governed by religion. Juergensmeyer argues that secularism and 
fundamentalism (what he calls religious nationalism) are both ideologies, complex 
systems of beliefs that aspire to shape political and social action. As such, secularism and 
fundamentalism are in direct competition with one another.
20
 For example, “creationists” 
are a form of Christian fundamentalists who see evolution as false teaching and in direct 
competition with their beliefs on how the world began. Some creationists feel that their 
beliefs are being marginalized in public schools and national discourse within the United 
States, prompting them to push for greater inclusion of the creationist perspective (also 
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It is important to note that, while some within religious groups feel secularism is 
threatening their faith, not all religious adherents are fundamentalists. The vast majority 
of those practicing religion do not see secularism as incompatible with faith, and continue 
to live in a world with secularist and modernist ideals as well as religious beliefs. 
However, for a minority, the rise of secularism is understood as a threat to the faith, and 
the need for direct action to prevent the further erosion of religion from public life.  
A second distinct trigger of fundamentalism is new interpretations and practices 
that emerge from within a particular religious tradition and that challenges more 
conservative understandings of the faith. For example, source criticism—the practice of 
using historical evidence to identify the sources of scripture in Christianity—ignited 
conflicts and schisms within several denominations between those that see Christian 
scriptures as the literal word of God and those that understand it to be divinely inspired, 
but also the product of humans. Source criticism caused a schism within the Lutheran 
church in America, creating what became the larger Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America, which uses source criticism, and several smaller Synods, which do not.
22
 More 
recent examples of new interpretations and practices within religious traditions include 
ordaining women as clerics, and sanctioning gay marriage. Fundamentalist reactions to 
new interpretations and practices within a religious tradition aim to prevent what they 
believe to be false and destructive beliefs and practices from taking hold. This type of 
fundamentalist response looks more like a civil war within a tradition, rather than a 
religious reaction against wider society or a government’s policies.    
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Fundamentalists react in at least three distinct ways to the perceived threats from 
secularism and new interpretations of the faith. First, fundamentalists may choose to 
isolate themselves from the threat. This course of action could include physically 
isolating by creating separate communities, or socially isolating the group from wider 
society by creating parallel institutions, such as schools, clinics, stores, and so on. 
Isolation is a possible course of action for either threats from secularization or new 
interpretations within the faith. Second, groups may attempt to change policies or other 
aspects of governance through political action, including through elections or pressuring 
the government for change through demonstrations and other means. The previously 
mentioned debate over teaching creationism in school is an example of groups using 
political action to change laws in their favor. Third, fundamentalists may choose violence 
as a course of action in an attempt to push back the perceived threat, either from society 
or from within the faith. These three courses of action are not mutually exclusive, and 
groups can change strategies over time or as the perception of threat changes.   
The goals of fundamentalists are to return the faith to what they believe is its 
pristine and correct state. This goal therefore suggests that the faith was practiced 
correctly at some point in its history—a “golden age”—but that this correct interpretation 
has been lost or corrupted and there is a need to get back to the fundamentals of the faith.  
This goal further suggests that fundamentalists believe there is only one right practice 
(orthopraxy) and belief (orthodoxy) of the faith; all other interpretations are wrong. 
Furthermore, fundamentalist aim to create clear borders that separate the true and faithful 
from the misguided and corrupt.  
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Almond, Appleby and Sivan identify nine characteristics, five ideological and 
four organizational, associated with fundamentalist movements: reactivity to the 
marginalization of the faith; selectivity in scripture and practices; moral Manichaenism 
(dividing the world between right and wrong, good and bad); absolutism and inerrancy of 
scriptures, beliefs and practices; millennialist thinking; elect and chosen membership; 
sharp boundaries; authoritarian organizations; and specific behavioral requirements.
23
     
These nine characteristics reveal interesting paradoxes in fundamentalist thinking 
and behavior. Fundamentalists claim to be returning to the pure form of their faith, yet 
they are selective with scriptures and the practices they emphasize. They reject 
secularism and claim to be upholding the founding practices of the faith, yet often use 
modern tools of technology to further their goals, such as computers, the internet and 
social media. They are millennialist, meaning that they long for life beyond this one, yet 
are deeply concerned with the world in the here-and-now. These paradoxes make 
negotiating with fundamentalists more difficult than with social movements, but still 
possible, as will be discussed in the final section. 
Fundamentalism is not unique to one religion; rather it can be found as a 
particular interpretation across religious traditions. Examples of fundamentalist 
movements include the Ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi within Judaism. The Haredi have 
strict regulations in both practices and beliefs of their Jewish faith. They have chosen to 
self-segregate into communities of like-minded adherents. In Israel, they have an enclave 
in Jerusalem, Meir Sharim, which includes its own schools and synagogues. The Haredim 
traditionally have not served in the Israeli military and, until recently, have eschewed 
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political participation. They consider the state of Israel a secular abomination that has 
failed to keep the true tenets of the faith.
24
 They do not use violence to further their goals. 
The anti-abortion movement in the United States is another example of a 
fundamentalist movement. While there may be a minority that objects to abortion on non-
religious grounds, most protesters see abortion as murder, and believe that it is a religious 
obligation to intervene to uphold the commandment “thou shall not murder.”   Beginning 
in the 1980s, the anti-abortion movement, especially the Army of God, believed 
(paradoxically) that violence and even murder was necessary to prevent abortion. The 
organization carried out clinic bombings and assassinations of clinic doctors and nurses.
25
  
A third example of a fundamentalist movement is the salafi interpretation of 
Islam. Salafi believe that Islam was at its most pure state during the time of the Prophet 
Mohammed and, following his death, the leadership of his companions (Salaf as-Saleh or 
“Pious Predecessors”), who knew the Prophet personally and could guide the community 
by his example. Salafi believe that the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet provide a 
complete guide for Islam today. Wictorowicz summarizes Salafism as follows: 
Salafis are united by a common religious creed, which provides principles and a 
method for applying religious beliefs to contemporary issues and problems. This 
creed revolves around strict adherence to the concept of tawhid (the oneness of 
God) and ardent rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire. Salafis 
believe that by strictly following the rules and guidance in the Qur’an and Sunna 
(path or example of the Prophet Muhammad) they eliminate the biases of human 
subjectivity and self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth 
of God’s commands. From this perspective, there is only one legitimate religious 




Salafism, therefore, aims return to what they believe was the golden age of Islam, where 
the faith was correctly understood and practiced. Wictorowicz notes that Salafi use 
different means to realize this goal; most are quietist, eschewing political involvement; 
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some are “politicos” and work through government (including democracy) to realize their 
goals or aim to seize the state by other means; and some are jihadis, believing that 
violence is the necessary path for change.
27
   
 
Cosmic War 
Cosmic War, a term coined by sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer, is perhaps the 
form of activism that is most commonly associated with religious violence.  In “Sacrifice 
and Cosmic War,” Juergensmeyer argues that virtually all of the world’s religious 
traditions contain scriptures and beliefs that describe divine battles between the forces of 
Good and Evil and that these battles are struggles to create “ultimate order” and conquer 
“ultimate disorder,” which is death.28 For many religions, the culmination of this battle is 
the belief in the end of times (such as the Apocalypse in Christianity, the End of Days in 
Judaism, the Last Judgment in Islam, and the arrival of Kalki, the tenth avatar of Vishnu 
in Hinduism), in which the final battle of Good vs. Evil will occur on this earth, and 
Good will triumph. The apocalypse is accompanied by clear signs that the end is near and 
that the faithful must rise up, stand firm in the face of trials and hardship, and defend the 
faith.  Religious adherents may even engage in Cosmic War because they believe that it 
will hasten the apocalypse, a practice known as “catastrophic Messianism.” Cosmic War 
occurs when adherents believe that current-day occurrences are signs that the end is here, 
and that their participation in the Final Battle is necessary. For those who participate in 
Cosmic War, the promise of salvation and the millennium, a period of peace and 
harmony, is promised. Juergensmeyer argues that Cosmic War is both deeply personal 
 14 




Cosmic War thinking is triggered by acute personal and collective trauma brought 
about by catastrophic events, or persistent trials. For example, war, occupation, 
corruption, lawlessness, and natural disasters may lead some to believe that these are 
signs of the end of times and the war between Good and Evil is occurring in the here-and-
now. Under these conditions, earthly battles become spiritual battles in which the faithful 
must participate. Juergensmeyer posits that holy battles for the conquest of Good over 
Evil know no specific enemy or definitive goal; rather, the battle is against amorphous 
disorder. Cosmic War, therefore, does not know incremental goals or compromise.
30
 
Political psychologists Robins and Post contend that charismatic leaders provide 
the necessary interpretation of events and direct followers through this time of calamity, 
offering hope to the faithful.
31
 They argue, “For the followers, such an inspired leader has 
provided a diagnosis of the ills afflicting the world and has given them a special role to 
play. He has made sense for them of the surrounding chaos.”32 In other words, leaders use 
scriptures and the expectation of the end times to offer an explanation for the suffering 
and trials of current situations and what individuals should do in order to liberate 
themselves, spiritually and literally, from these trying circumstances.  
Unlike social movements and fundamentalists, violence in Cosmic War is a 
necessary condition. Cosmic Warriors expect to encounter violent opposition and to meet 
violence with violence. However, violence is more than just a necessary instrument for 
achieving Cosmic Warriors’ millennialist goals; it is a sacred and necessary duty that 
cleanses the world of sin and evil. Furthermore, Cosmic Warriors often depict their 
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struggle in contradictory terms, that the world must be destroyed in order for it to be 
saved, or that the war cannot be lost, but may be unwinnable in this lifetime.
33
  
Several examples illustrate the complexity of Cosmic War thinking. For example, 
Pope Urban II called the Christian Crusades in 1095 to aid the Byzantine Empire and 
liberate Jerusalem from “infidels.” The Pope promised salvation to those who undertook 
the sacred battle.
34
  The First Crusade was supposed to be an organized military 
expedition, headed by lords from participating countries. However Peter the Hermit, a 
charismatic French ascetic, heard the Pope’s call and began to raise his own army of 
commoners bent on hastening the second coming of Jesus and securing their eternal 
salvation. Answering his call, average citizens marched off to Jerusalem in the spring of 
1096 in search of salvation and the second coming of Jesus, slaughtering Jews in the 
Rhine Valley on their way.
35
  Crusading evolved into a sporadic, holy war that drew 
Europeans in search of fortune, adventure and salvation. At perhaps its greatest extreme, 
the Children’s Crusade inspired thousands of peasants to walk over the Alps to the sea, 
where they believed they would be miraculously transported to Jerusalem. Nearly all died 
in the mountains.
36
    
A more recent example of Cosmic War thinking involves the ideology of Aum 
Shinrikyo. Led by the semi-blind Japanese social outcast Shoko Asahara, the movement 
aimed to rid the world of impurities by using WMD to start World War III, which would 
cause massive death and destruction.  Asahara promised his followers that they would be 
miraculously preserved from the battle, or would be reincarnated, and would live to 
repopulate the earth; in fact he promised paradoxically to save the world by destroying 
it.
37
  In 1995, Aum followers attempted to realize their apocalyptic dreams by deploying 
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Sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, which they believed would spark World War III. The 
attacks killed thirteen and wounded hundreds. Asahara and 200 members were convicted 
for the attacks in 2000 and Asahara has been on death row since that time.  At its zenith, 
Aum Shinrikyo was estimated to have more than 30,000 members around the globe and 




Some contemporary Islamic activism shows signs of Cosmic War thinking. 
Current earthly struggles are representations of a much bigger battle between the forces 
of Good and Evil. These struggles are trials requiring the faithful to rise up and fight in 
defense of the faith and bring about not only the salvation of the world in the here-and-
now but eternal salvation.  For example, Sheikh Azzam, Osama Bin Laden’s mentor, 
describes a battle waging between the dar al Islam (the Muslim world) and the rest of the 
world, the dar al harb, literally the abode of war, and the need for all Muslims to rise up 
and defend the faith. In “Martyrs: the Building Block of Nations,” Azzam states:  
A small group: they are the ones who carry convictions and ambitions. And an 
even smaller group from this small group, are the ones who flee from the worldly 
life in order to spread and act upon these ambitions. And an even smaller group 
from this elite group, are the ones who sacrifice their souls and their blood in 
order to bring victory to these ambitions and principles… It is not possible to 
reach glory except by traversing this Path. And glory cannot be architectured 




As will be described, current Islamic activism runs the gamut of social movements, to 
fundamentalists, to Cosmic Warriors. It is essential to differentiate one type from another 
because they each carry distinct countermeasures.  
 
Comparing the three theories, dynamical change, and key questions 
 17 
 Social movements, fundamentalists and Cosmic Warriors present a range of 
conditions under which religious groups engage in activism and use violence to further 
social, political and religious goals. A brief comparison of the three lenses illustrates the 
different characteristics of each form of activism.  
 First, social movements tend to be large in size and are highly visible. They 
typically are comprised of multiple groups and networks that are united around a specific 
and limited goal, such as changing a policy, a particular social practice, or (at its most 
extreme) revolution. Once achieved, the movement usually breaks up and groups 
continue to act on their own agendas. Social movements draw on various resources to 
mobilize and organize participants, including material resources, networks, narratives, 
symbols, and other forms of communication. Participants in social movements may be 
highly motivated but, due to their size, individuals may come and go with relative ease. 
Historically, social movements have had a charismatic leader who helps to unify different 
groups, provide inspiration, and direct participants towards a specific goal. However, 
recent examples of social movements, particularly in the Arab Spring uprisings, suggest 
that social movements may not need charismatic leaders to form or prosper. Religion 
provides useful resources to social movements, such as leadership, networks, moral 
legitimacy, material resources, and unifying symbols. Violence, if used at all, is an 
instrument that furthers the movement’s goals.   
 Fundamentalists emerge in response to two perceived or actual threats to the faith: 
secularism, which threatens to erode religion from public life; and new interpretations 
within the faith, which threaten more traditional understandings of the religion. 
Fundamentalists aim to create clear distinctions between the faithful and the rest by 
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reinforcing specific beliefs and practices (orthodoxism and orthopraxism), which they 
claim to be the original, pure and true practice of the faith.  Despite describing their 
actions in terms of authenticity, fundamentalists are usually selective with their use of 
scripture, symbols, practices and history.  Fundamentalists do not accept multiple 
interpretations of the faith, nor is debate welcome; there is only one correct 
understanding, which they possess. Fundamentalists choose different means for 
reinforcing and defending their interpretation of the faith, including isolation, political 
activism and violence. When violence is used, it is a means for realizing the group’s 
goals.  
 Cosmic Warriors believe that current calamities are signs that the end of times are 
near, and that it is incumbent on all the faithful to rise up and fight on behalf of God. In 
some cases, Cosmic Warriors aim to foster “apocalyptic messianism,”—to create the 
conditions for the end of times, such as wars, mass famine, and destruction—which will 
be followed by a new era of peace and prosperity. Cosmic Warriors are usually few in 
number and highly committed; their presence initially may not be visible to wider 
society. Typically, Cosmic Warriors mobilize around a charismatic leader who helps to 
make sense of the chaos and directs the faithful in the right course of action. Cosmic 
Warriors believe that violence is not only necessary to bring about cataclysmic change, 
but that it is a sacred duty and will help to cleanse the world of sin and pave the way for 
the millennium. Self-sacrifice and martyrdom, giving one’s life for the cause, are 
necessary actions that will help realize the promise of salvation. 
 The conditions that lead to social movements, fundamentalism and Cosmic War 
are summarized in Table 1. 
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In theory, these three causal arguments for religious activism are distinct but, in 
practice, they are less clear and groups may contain elements of more than one type. For 
example, social movements may use Cosmic War imagery and thinking to mobilize 
segments of the population. The Ayatollah Khomeini drew on the promise of the return 
of the 12
th
 Imam—a messianic leader that Shias believe will restore justice in the 
world—to mobilize the population against the shah. This tactic helped create one of the 
largest mass protests of the 20
th
 century. 
1.1 Three Lenses of Religious Activism 
Type Goal Size Leadership 
and 
structure 






































































Groups may also change over time and according to shifts in political 
circumstances, frustrations within a group, or unfulfilled prophecies. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, for example, has the distinctly fundamentalist goals of realizing what they 
believe to be the correct interpretation of the faith and to reject new innovations in 
Muslim thinking. However, the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in Egypt, has also 
sought to create a social movement with the aim of bringing all Muslims “back” to the 
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faith. The Muslim Brotherhood has also widened its scope by running for office, which 
requires mobilizing mass support in the form of votes and, if elected, require compromise 
and working with secular and other religious groups.   
A group may also become frustrated with their progress, which could cause it to 
shift from one type of activism to another. For example, fundamentalists who are unable 
to persuade those within their faith of their beliefs and practices, and who may actually be 
losing supporters, could turn to Cosmic War thinking to explain their trials as a sign of 
the apocalypse and to stay the course. Fundamentalists who isolate themselves may move 
towards paranoia, which could also fuel Cosmic War thinking and justify violence and 
martyrdom. 
Several key questions can help identify the different causal paths of social 
movements, fundamentalism and Cosmic War.  
First, what does victory look like to the group or movement? In other words, what 
are the goals for which the group is fighting? Social movements typically have specific 
and limited goals, such as changing a policy, and victory is measured by the degree to 
which these goals are met. Fundamentalists may also have specific goals, such as to 
preserve what they believe to be the correct interpretation of the faith, but these goals are 
significantly broader than changing a policy or even a head of state. Victory for a 
fundamentalist, therefore, is less clear than for social movements. Cosmic Warriors’ 
goals transcend this world to include fostering the conditions of the apocalypse and the 
hope of salvation.   
Within the question of the group’s goals, it is also important to consider both what 
the group says and what it does, which offers interesting clues about a group and its 
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organization. Specifically, do rhetoric and actions mirror each other, or not?  For 
example, around the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Al Qaeda’s senior leadership 
expressed frustration over the affiliate Al Qaeda in Iraq’s brutal tactics and high casualty 
rates among Iraqi civilians, which was driving the population away from the movement. 
The senior leadership, in other words, wanted to win large segments of the population 
over to their movement, but the actions of their affiliate were losing support among the 
people.
40
   This disconnect between the rhetoric and goals of senior leaders, and the goals 
and actions of their subordinates, suggests that organizational control was not tight with 
Al Qaeda at this time, and that there were disagreements between what Stout calls the 
“strategists” and the “foot soldiers.”41 This disconnect offers opportunities for 
countermeasures, which will be discussed below. 
Second, who are the leaders and followers? Leadership will most likely look 
different depending on the type of group. Social movements require leaders that various 
segments of society see as legitimate to successfully foster mass mobilization. If religion 
is involved, social movements will most likely draw from well-known religious leaders 
from within the clergy. Examples of these leaders include Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. in the U.S. Civil Rights movement, Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu in the anti-
apartheid movement, and the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s leadership in the Iranian 
revolution. Fundamentalist leaders may come from within the established religious 
leadership, or may be from outside the leadership and in direct opposition to it. The U.S. 
anti-abortion initiative drew from ordained ministers from a variety of Christian 
denominations. However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership is not typically from the 
trained Islamic leadership (the Ulama) in Egypt, and stands in direct criticism of what 
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they see as the Ulama’s failed leadership. Cosmic Warriors also tend to have leaders that 
are not part of the trained clergy and therefore cannot easily be censured by religious 
hierarchy. Prior to the start of the First Crusade in 1096, Peter the Hermit—a self-
proclaimed religious leader—whipped up popular sentiment for the Crusade, promising 
the second coming of Jesus and salvation for its participants. His legitimacy stemmed 
from his charisma and believed connection to the divine, not his ties to the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy.  
Social movements will likely have a wide array of participants from a variety of 
groups all unified around a common purpose, such as changing a policy or ousting a 
country’s leader. Adherents within a fundamentalist movement will look much more 
uniform and will likely conform to a clear-cut and rigid set of beliefs and practices. 
Cosmic Warriors tend to be relatively few in number and highly committed. Cosmic 
Warriors may keep their group hidden from mainstream society as they fight to bring 
about the conditions of the apocalypse. 
Also within this question, it is important to ask if leaders and followers want the 
same thing. Primary documents from Al Qaeda following the 9/11 attacks suggest that 
the senior leadership wanted to create a social movement aimed at bringing the entire 
Muslim world to what they believed to be the correct interpretation of the faith. However, 
some rank and file were joining the movement with the desire to hasten the apocalypse 
and earn salvation for themselves and their family. This disconnect between leaders and 
followers created problems for organizational unity and purpose.  
Third, it is important to ask: What does the group’s organization look like? Each 
of these types of religious activism has different organizational structures. Social 
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movements tend to be open and porous; participants can come or go from the movement 
and it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell how many are part of the movement once it 
takes root and grows within the population. Furthermore, social movements can be 
relatively flat structures, as was the case in the Arab Spring, or could be composed of a 
multitude of smaller hierarchical organizations that are only loosely affiliated to one 
another. Fundamentalist groups tend to be closed movements with clear distinctions of 
who is in and who is out, along with authoritative leadership and hierarchy. This type of 
organizational structure creates the necessary control over beliefs and behavior. Cosmic 
Warriors also tend to have closed organizations with hierarchy to impose control over its 
followers. But Cosmic War thinking can spin out of control and leaders can lose control 
over their followers, as was the case with Peter the Hermit and the People’s Crusade and 
some of Al Qaeda’s Cosmic War thinking and martyrdom operations that have killed 
more Muslims than foreigners.  
These three principle questions for identifying religious activism—the goals, the 
leaders and followers, and the organizational structure of the group—are important for 
formulating countermeasures for containing violent religious activism. As the 
composition, tactics, and goals of social movements, fundamentalists, and Cosmic 
Warriors vary, so do countermeasures against these groups. 
 
Countermeasures in religiously motivated violence 
 Not all religious activism requires measures aimed at countering its effects; some 
religious activism has goals that are productive to society and governance. The U.S. Civil 
Rights movement, the anti-Apartheid movement, and Gandhi’s Quit India movement are 
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all examples of religious activism that have spurred societies to become more just and 
equitable. Therefore, the first consideration when confronted with religious activism 
should be the goals for which the movement is fighting and the extent to which these 
goals promote greater liberty to all within a society, country or region. If they do, then 
measures aimed at countering the movement are most likely unnecessary. 
 However, not all religious activism serves the greater good and much of it does 
require a reaction from the state. Therefore, countermeasures for each of the three 
variants are proposed below.   
 Social movements tend to have specific and limited goals; therefore 
countermeasures should focus on negotiation and compromise between the state and the 
movement. Negotiations and compromise could allow for the state and the movement to 
come to common ground and understanding, specifically on goals relating to changing a 
policy or practice. For social movements that aim to oust a leader or change a 
government, compromise on either side is unlikely, given the objective. However, 
negotiations could help facilitate a peaceful change of leadership, depending on the 
nature of the state.  
If popular, embedded in society, and viewed as legitimate, the state’s use of 
violence to counter a social movement may be counterproductive, especially if the 
movement is focused on upending the regime. The state’s use of violence to counter a 
social movement, therefore, has a limited but potentially useful role.  The state could use 
the threat of violence or its actual employment to bring the movement to the negotiation 
table or keep it from leaving. It could also use force to contain fringe movements bent on 
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using terrorist tactics or other forms of violence to further the cause. Overall, however, 
the state’s use of state violence to counter social movements should be minimal. 
 Fundamentalists are highly reactionary, particularly to perceived or actual threats 
to their understanding of the faith. Overall, the goal in confronting fundamentalism 
should be to prevent the group from further radicalizing, and to bring it back into a more 
mainstream understanding of the religion. Therefore, countermeasures should focus on 
reducing the sense of threat these groups feel. One approach states could employ to 
reducing fundamentalists’ sense of threat is to give the group space to retreat and practice 
their interpretation of the faith. For example, the 2002 school voucher program in the No 
Child Left Behind Act made it easier for parents to opt out of public education and use 
their tax dollars to pay for enrollment in private schools or home schooling. Although 
controversial, this piece of legislation gave creationists space to adhere to their beliefs 
and practices.
42
  However, if the state were to employ this approach, it would be 
necessary to monitor the group for signs of further radicalization, which could occur if 
isolated.  
Perhaps even more so than with social movements, the use of force as a 
countermeasure against fundamentalists has severe limitations; using force against a 
group that has a heightened sense of threat would most likely exacerbate these anxieties. 
Force could be useful to contain or eliminate groups that have become severely isolated 
and pose a threat to wider society, but this approach would most likely be useful under 
the direst of circumstances. Space, monitoring, and the use of law enforcement to contain 
fundamentalists and reduce their sense of threat is a better approach.   
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Finally, Cosmic Warriors require special countermeasures and perhaps are the 
most difficult group for states to neutralize. Unlike social movements and 
fundamentalists, all Cosmic Warriors who direct their violence outside the group are a 
threat to wider society. Furthermore, Cosmic Warriors anticipate confrontation and trials; 
it is written into their expectations of the apocalypse. Therefore directly confronting 
Cosmic Warriors, especially with force, could feed their ideology and potentially grow 
the movement. Juergensmeyer argues that Cosmic War has two solutions: the first is the 
total defeat of the group, the second is “redirecting the mythology,” or challenging the 
group’s interpretation of the faith.43 With Juergensmeyer’s second solution, Cosmic War 
zeal could be reduced by sparking a debate within a religious tradition over the 
immanency of the apocalypse. A debate over this interpretation throws into question the 
inerrancy of the leader and his views, which opens the door for an adjustment of the 
ideology.  For example, the Saudi government has helped facilitate an internet chat room 
that draws jihadis into a debate with rehabilitated terrorists about the religious necessity 
and justification of their actions.
44
 The idea is to get potential recruits and those within 
the organization to question the ideology. Within this approach, it is important that the 
state does not engage the group directly in a theological debate, because the state is most 
likely seen as illegitimate and incapable of having a theological discussion. Similarly, 
using the religion’s mainstream clergy may be counterproductive because Cosmic 
Warriors often stand in critique of clergy for failing to see the signs of the apocalypse. 
Rather, much can be gained from engaging former Cosmic Warriors that have had a 
change of heart, as has been done in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and London.
45
 In this case, the 
messenger is as important as the message.    
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The use of force as a potential countermeasure to Cosmic Warriors has a limited, 
but useful role. Force could be used to go after a group that is small, isolated, and 
contained. In this case, the state’s use of force would most likely fulfill Cosmic Warriors’ 
ideology, but wider society would not be in agreement with this ideology, and therefore 
would not join the group.  Similarly, force could be used to take out a Cosmic Warrior’s 
leader if the group’s organization is well understood and the state has an understanding of 
how that would affect the group. Cosmic War may be driven solely by a charismatic 
leader, and removing that leader would end the threat.  
Finally, it is worth noting that, in the case of Islamically motivated Cosmic War, 
the Arab Spring stands as a sharp critique to its apocalyptic worldview. The Arab Spring 
erupted in several countries to demand the right of citizens to choose their government 
leaders, for greater liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly, and for a civil 
society independent from governmental interference. In other words, the Arab Spring has 
demanded rights that are more in line with western forms of democracy than apocalyptic 
visions of final judgment. This is good news for the ideological battle against Cosmic 
War thinking. If true, then Arab masses within several states have spoken and they are 
not in a Cosmic War mindset. Their rejection of this worldview will go a long way in 
countering its potential threat.   
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